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Reasons for endorsing or rejecting self-binding directives in 
bipolar disorder: a qualitative study of survey responses 
from UK service users
Tania Gergel*, Preety Das*, Gareth Owen, Lucy Stephenson, Larry Rifkin, Guy Hindley, John Dawson, Alex Ruck Keene
Summary
Background Self-binding directives instruct clinicians to overrule treatment refusal during future severe episodes of 
illness. These directives are promoted as having the potential to increase autonomy for individuals with severe 
episodic mental illness. Although lived experience is central to their creation, the views of service users on self-
binding directives have not been investigated substantially. This study aimed to explore whether reasons for 
endorsement, ambivalence, or rejection given by service users with bipolar disorder can address concerns regarding 
self-binding directives, decision-making capacity, and human rights.
Methods This qualitative study used data from an internet-based survey distributed to the mailing list of the UK 
charity Bipolar UK, which contained multiple closed and open questions on advance decision making for patients 
with bipolar disorder. We included participants who reported that they have been diagnosed with bipolar disorder by 
a professional (doctor or psychiatrist). In a previous study, quantitative analysis of a closed question about self-binding 
directives had shown endorsement among a high proportion of participants with bipolar disorder who completed the 
survey. In this study, we did a thematic analysis of responses from those participants who answered a subsequent 
open question about reasons for their view. Research was done within a multidisciplinary team, including team 
members with clinical, legal, and ethical expertise, and lived experience of bipolar disorder. Ideas and methods 
associated with all these areas of expertise were used in the thematic analysis to gain insight into the thoughts of 
individuals with bipolar disorder about self-binding directives and associated issues.
Findings Between Oct 23, 2017, and Dec 5, 2017, 932 individuals with a self-reported clinical diagnosis of bipolar 
disorder completed the internet survey, with 565 individuals (154 men, 400 women, 11 transgender or other), 
predominantly white British, providing free-text answers to the open question. 463 (82%) of the 565 participants 
endorsed self-binding directives, of whom 411 (89%) describing a determinate shift to distorted thinking and decision 
making when unwell as their key justification. Responses indicating ambivalence (37 [7%) of the 565 responses) were 
dominated by logistical concerns about the drafting and implementation of self-binding directives, whereas those 
who rejected self-binding directives (65 [12%] of the 565 responses) cited logistical concerns, validity of their thinking 
when unwell, and potential contravention of human rights.
Interpretation This study is, to our knowledge, the first large study assessing the reasons why mental health service 
users might endorse or reject the use of self-binding directives. The findings provide empirical support for introducing 
self-binding directives into mental health services as well as advance decision-making practice and policy, and might 
help address enduring ethical concerns surrounding possible implementation of the directive while a person retains 
decision-making capacity. The opinions expressed here in responses given by multiple service users with bipolar 
disorder challenge a prominent view within international disability rights debates that involuntary treatment and 
recognition of impaired mental capacity constitute inherent human rights violations.
Funding The Wellcome Trust.
Copyright © 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an Open Access article under the CC BY 4.0 
License.
Introduction
So-called self-binding directives, sometimes known as 
Ulysses contracts, have been promoted since the 1970s 
as a means of damage limitation for people with severe 
episodic mental illness. These directives, which are 
based on lived experience of harms occurring when treat-
ment is accessed too late, instruct clinicians to overrule 
treatment refusal during future severe episodes by using 
involuntary treatment. Following extensive legal and 
ethical discussion, mental health laws have started to 
provide for self-binding directives in some jurisdictions 
in Europe, North America, and Australasia. However, 
enduring concerns have hindered construction of a 
widely accepted self-binding directive model that is 
clinically and legally practicable.1–3 The main concern is 
how to ensure that an individual’s decision-making 
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capacity for treatment is definitely impaired when a self-
binding directive is implemented as a form of early 
intervention. Although lived experience is central 
to creating a self-binding directive, evidence regarding 
service user views about their use is scarce.4,5
Service users drafting self-binding directives usually 
accept that: severe illness impairs decision-making 
capacity for treatment; future treatment refusal might 
cause them harm; and involuntary treatment potentially 
offers protection, control, and increased autonomy.1 
Although a small body of research examining service 
users’ retrospective views of involuntary treatment found 
that a substantial proportion thought it was justified,6–8 
involuntary treatment and substitute decision making—
ie, when decisions relating to a person whose decision-
making capacity is judged to be impaired are made by 
another person—are generally seen as deeply con-
troversial.9 In particular, the UN Committee on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities rejects the notion of impaired 
decision-making capacity and has called for complete 
abolition of involuntary treatment.10
This study aims to understand how these ideas relate 
to highly influential human rights and ethical assump-
tions surrounding autonomy and psychiatry. We 
examine whether reasons given by service users with 
bipolar disorder for endorsing or rejecting self-binding 
dir ec tives provide empirical support for the use of 
such directives and address concerns specific to self-
binding directives, such as worries about implementation 
before the loss of decision-making capacity, and broader 
human rights concerns. We focused on people with 
bipolar disorder because severe periods of bipolar illness 
are typically episodic and repetitive and often feature a 
loss of decision-making capacity for treatment that is 
regained during recovery, and because there is a paucity 
of research on advance decision making for this 
condition.11,12
Methods
Study design and participants 
For the original survey, our target population comprised 
20 134 people on the mailing list of Bipolar UK, the UK’s 
largest charity dedicated to bipolar disorder. These 
20 134 people had registered their email and provided 
consent to be contacted by the charity at the time of 
distribution. On Oct 23, 2017, Bipolar UK sent a dedicated 
email containing the URL to the online questionnaire 
with a description of the project and a request for 
participants. The survey remained open until Dec 5, 2017. 
Bipolar UK continued to promote the survey via social 
media, monthly newsletters, a reminder email, and direct 
communication via support groups throughout the 
6-week period to maximise response rate. Res pondents 
were able to revisit pages already completed and edit 
Research in context
Evidence before this study
We searched PubMed and Scopus from database inception to 
Feb 4, 2020, with the broad terms (“self-binding directive” OR 
“Ulysses” OR “self-binding”) AND (“psychiatric” OR “mental 
disorder” OR “mental illness” OR “bipolar” OR “mental health”), 
without any language restrictions. We supplemented the search 
by reviewing reference lists and forward citations, until no 
additional relevant articles could be identified. We repeated our 
searches on Nov 2, 2020, to check for new publications. 
With the exception of three very small interview-based surveys, 
all of which included clinicians and service users, research found 
on self-binding directives as a form of mental health advance 
decision making was restricted to medico-ethical and legal 
analysis, despite calls from researchers for empirical work. 
We found no large studies investigating the views of service 
users on self-binding directives. There was a paucity of research 
investigating the views of service users with bipolar disorder on 
advance decision making in general.
Added value of this study
This is, to our knowledge, the first large study to provide 
empirical evidence about the views of mental health service 
users on self-binding directives. We found that the majority of 
service user participants endorsed self-binding directives on the 
basis that the participants viewed severe episodes of illness as 
involving a determinate shift and impairment of their thinking 
and decision making. At the same time, the study includes 
respondents who rejected this view, demonstrating diversity of 
opinions among service users with bipolar disorder. This study 
counters key ethical concerns that have so far prevented the 
introduction of workable self-binding directives into psychiatric 
practice and mental health legislation. It also contributes to 
research on advance decision making in people with bipolar 
disorder, by supporting the need to consider diverse outcomes 
and to incorporate empirical studies of stakeholder views.
Implications of all the available evidence
The endorsement by the majority of service user respondents of 
involuntary treatment on the basis of impaired decision-
making abilities counters a widespread view, upheld by the UN 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, that 
psychiatric use of capacity assessment and involuntary 
treatment necessarily violate fundamental human rights. 
Researchers, clinicians, and policy makers should consider that 
some service users with severe mental health conditions wish 
to request their own future involuntary treatment, using 
self-binding directives as a way to self-manage their illness and 
increase autonomy. When assessing the ethical viability of 
self-binding directives, mental capacity, and involuntary 
treatment, human rights advocates need to take a broad range 
of service user views into account.
For more on Bipolar UK see 
https://www.bipolaruk.org/
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responses, and only completed questionnaires could be 
accessed for analysis by the research team. The internet 
survey medium was helpful for ensuring wide dis-
tribution and facilitating privacy and full anonymity when 
answering questions con cerning such sensitive subject 
matter. Inclusion cri teria were having provided informed 
consent and being either a person with, or a carer for a 
person with, a self-reported diagnosis of bipolar disorder 
by an appropriate pro fessional (doctor or psychologist).
Informed consent was sought from potential par-
ticipants before the start of the survey. Participants were 
given the opportunity to provide personal email addresses 
if they wanted to receive more information about the 
project in the future. These participants were uncoupled 
from the data before the analysis to prevent loss of 
anonymity. No other identifying information was sought 
in the questionnaire. Ethics approval was provided by the 
London–Surrey Borders Research Ethics Committee 
and Health Research Authority (REC reference number 
17/LO/1071).
Procedures
The exploratory survey asked about experiences and 
attitudes towards advance decision making. The survey 
included closed and open (free-text) questions. A brief 
introductory section included a simple explanation of 
advance care planning and existing provision within the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 (England and Wales) for formal 
advance decision making. No other background infor-
mation was included. The questionnaire can be accessed 
online. The quantitative analysis of all answers from the 
service users to closed questions and a detailed des-
cription of the survey’s rationale and methods have been 
published previously.11
The survey was designed following a review of the 
literature. First, a pilot questionnaire was formulated and 
reviewed by the research team. The revised questionnaire 
was then reviewed by two experienced Bipolar UK 
employees before being piloted on eight people with 
bipolar disorder and five carers who provided written 
feedback. Follow-up interviews were done with one of the 
service users and one of the carers to discuss the feedback 
in detail and trial possible alterations. The questionnaire 
was revised a second time by the original research team 
(GH, TG, LS, GO, LR, ARK). Both the original survey 
research team and extended research team (all authors) 
for the current study included individuals with expertise 
in psychiatry, medical ethics, law, psychotherapy, and 
lived experience of advance decision making for people 
with bipolar disorder, allowing multidisciplinary and 
coproduced study design and analysis throughout.
One closed question was: “Some people think a ‘self-
binding statement’ is a good idea. This states that the 
person wants the contents of their advance care plan to 
be respected even if they no longer agree with it during 
an episode of illness. Do you think this is a good 
idea?”. The wording “Some people think a ‘self-binding 
state ment’ is a good idea” was chosen as a means to 
stimulate critical thinking and is indicative of the 
positive general consensus among available discussions 
about the idea of self-binding directives, despite various 
concerns. As a response, participants filled out a Likert-
type scale from 1 to 5 with the following options: 
(1) “definitely yes”, (2) “probably yes”, (3) “neither yes 
nor no”, (4) “probably no”, and (5) “definitely no”. For 
the current study, we classified closed answers as: (1) 
and (2) indicating endorsement (hereafter referred to as 
the endorsement group), (3) indicating ambivalence 
(here after referred to as the ambivalence group), and (4) 
and (5) indicating rejection (hereafter referred to as 
the rejection group). The results showed high levels of 
endorsement, with 719 (77%) of 932 participants 
expressing endorsement, 120 (13%) expressing ambi-
valence, and 90 (10%) expressing rejection, and only 
three participants did not answer.11
A further open question, “Why do you think this is?”, 
invited free-text responses, without a fixed word limit. 
The aim of the current study was to understand more 
about reasons for endorsement, rejection, or ambivalence, 
by analysing the free-text answers.
Data analysis
Given the complexity of the self-binding directive con cept, 
we excluded free-text responses in which factors such as 
brevity or apparent incongruity between quan titative and 
qualitative responses made it unclear whether the concept 
had been understood. Qualitative free-text answers were 
assessed both independently and then in terms of 
congruity with the classification of the quan titative 
answers. PD and TG did the initial independent checks of 
all answers and their initial analysis aligned almost 
completely. PD and TG then discussed together and 
reached agreement concerning the small number of cases 
that remained uncertain (56 of 621 answers), and the 
classification of all answers was circulated among LS, GO, 
ARK, and LR, to check until final agreement was reached.
Although usually short, the free-text answers, linked 
directly to the quantitative endorsement question, 
provided a conceptually rich and varied dataset, and we 
used thematic analysis to identify themes within it.13 To 
emphasise distinct patterns emerging from the data, we 
combined in-depth conceptual analysis of inductively 
derived themes with quantitative analysis of theme 
distribution, following established methods for analysing 
open survey responses.14,15
Data were entered into coding software (NVivo 12). 
PD and TG read the raw data independently, discussed 
initial reflections, and then developed a preliminary 
coding framework. An inductive approach was used 
and both the coding framework and the themes were 
refined through an iterative process, including regular 
con sultation with all authors, until saturation was 
reached. The data for each theme were then checked 
several times by both PD and TG to ensure conceptual 
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Survey population 
(n=565)
Age, years  
















Gypsy or Romany 0
Indian 2
Latin American 1
Mixed White and Asian 3
Mixed White and Black African 1










Single, not in a relationship 127
Married or civil partnership 237
In a relationship and living with partner 62







No formal qualification 19
GCSE or equivalent 63
A Level or equivalent 70




(Table 1 continues in next column)
Survey population 
(n=565)







Long-term sickness or disability 147
Retired 81
Carer 4
Looking after family or home 22
Other 22
No response 5















East of England 40
East Midlands 27
West Midlands 40








5 or more 91
Do not know 5
No response 2




5 or more 20
No response 7
(Table 1 continues in next column)
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coherence, and final percentages for distribution of 
each theme within the endorsement, ambivalence, and 
rejection groups were calculated.
Role of the funding source 
The funder of the study had no role in study design, data 
collection, data analysis, data interpretation, or writing of 
the report.
Results
Between Oct 23, 2017, and Dec 5, 2017, the questionnaire 
was sent to 20 134 people and accessed by 3418 people, 
with 1131 people completing the questionnaire or a 
parallel carer’s questionnaire, constituting a response 
rate of 5·61%. This rate was the combined response rate 
for both service users and carers, given that the total 
number of service users and carers among the target 
population was unknown. 50 completed service user 
questionnaires were excluded because of absence of 
consent or not meeting the diagnostic inclusion criteria. 
This exclusion left a study population of 932 service 
users with bipolar disorder, of whom 621 answered the 
free-text question about self-binding directives. After 
data quality checks, 56 (9%) of the 621 responses were 
excluded, leaving a dataset of 565 service user responses, 
divided into endorsement, ambivalence, and rejection 
groups. Response rates for the free-text question were 
high among participants who endorsed (463 [64%] of 
719 responders) and rejected (65 [72%] of 90 responders), 
but lower among those who were ambivalent (37 [31%] 
of 120 responders).
565 (61%) of the 932 participants provided reasons 
behind their answers to the closed question about 
endorsement of the self-binding directives concept. 
These participants had self-identified as having a 
diagnosis of bipolar disorder and were predominantly 
white British, women, and well educated (table 1). Many 
respondents had lived experience of severe illness and 
treatment for which self-binding directives would apply. 
A majority (352 [62%]) reported at least one episode of 
hos pitalisation, a third (193 [34%]) reported at least 
one experience of formal involuntary detention, and 
many mentioned experiences of mania, psychosis, 
and sui cidality. The proportion of respondents reporting 
hospitalisation experiences within the endorsement, 
ambivalence, and rejection groups was similar, with 
slightly higher rates of previous detention among those 
who endorsed or were ambivalent than among 
those who rejected the idea of self-binding statements. 
The distribution of hospitalisation rates was 291 (63%) 
of 463 respondents in the endorsement group, 24 (65%) 
of 37 respondents in the ambivalence group, and 
37 (57%) of 65 respondents in the rejection group. For 
detention rates it was 165 (36%) of 463 respondents in 
the endorsement group, 12 (32%) of 37 respondents in 
the ambivalence group, and 16 (25%) of 65 respondents 
in the rejection group.
Although 463 (82%) of the 565 participants endorsed 
self-binding directives, support was not unanimous, with 
37 (7%) participants being ambivalent and 65 (12%) 
rejecting (table 2). Five clear themes concerning reasons 
for endorsement, ambivalence, or rejection emerged. 
Reasons for endorsing self-binding directives were 
classified into two themes: distorted thinking when 
unwell and benefits. Reasons for rejecting or questioning 
self-binding directives were classified into three themes: 
logistical concerns relating to drafting and imple-
mentation, valid thinking when unwell, and harms. Both 
the benefits and harms themes were subdivided into 
conceptual and practical subthemes, to differentiate 
between outcomes such as increased or decreased 
empowerment (conceptual) and reduced suicide risk 
(practical).
The most striking result was the predominance of the 
distorted thinking when unwell theme (table 2) and the 
remarkably varied articulations of this idea (panel; see 
appendix pp 1–23 for full dataset).
A key reason for endorsing self-binding directives was 
the theme of distorted thinking when unwell. This theme 
appeared in nearly all endorsements (411 [89%] of the 
463 endorsements), and even within some rejection and 
ambivalence responses. The term distorted, used by a few 
participants, was chosen for this theme’s name, to capture 
Survey population 
(n=565)










Obsessive compulsive disorder 45




Attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder 12
Emotionally unstable personality disorder 49
Other personality disorder 24
Other 15
Time since diagnosis, years
Mean (SD) 12·9 (11·1)
No response 7
Data are n or mean (SD). GCSE=General Certificate of Secondary Education (in the 
UK except Scotland).
Table 1: Demographical details of the survey population
See Online for appendix
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the central idea of adverse change in thought processes, 
without the distinct judgment conveyed by terms such as 
invalid. This adverse change was presented as a substantial 
alteration from valid thinking when well and was generally 
described as a determinate shift that substantially com-
promised decision-making abilities. A response example 
from the endorsement group was: “A person going 
through a manic episode has, by definition, seriously 
distorted thinking. If a person is manic to the extent that 
they cannot make their own decisions then again, by 
definition, they are not in a right mind to refute their 
advance care plan—otherwise it’s basically worthless.”
Thought processes when well were presented as valid 
or authentic, either explicitly or implicitly. Participants 
linked this idea to using lived experience of previous 
episodes of severe illness to understand both the effect 
of distorted thinking when unwell on decision-making 
abilities and how to manage future episodes. Many 
respondents stated explicitly that the breakdown of 
decision-making abilities justifies overruling their 
treatment decisions “during an episode of illness”. Some 
of the free-text answers referred to outcomes of decision 
making, rather than simply the process, and used 
language clearly implying value judgments, such as 
best, right, good, or wise decision. The effect on decision-
making ability and outcomes was expressed with great 
variety, ranging from the appearance of directly evoking 
medicolegal terminology associated with decision-
making capacity to using far less technical language.
Many participants used diagnostic terms like mania, 
psychosis, and depression when explaining the distorted 
thinking and shift from valid to distorted thinking when 
becoming unwell, whereas others used the concept from 
psychiatry of lack of insight into one’s illness. Many 
responses conveyed distortion through stark descriptions 
of so-called irrationality, using highly emotive and even 
stigmatising language. Such responses might represent a 
deliberately hyperbolic attempt to distance themselves 
from their so-called ill self—a distancing also expressed by 
presenting distortion as a fundamental change of identity.
Some respondents presented the benefits (theme) of 
self-binding directives as a reason for endorsing their use 
and suggest potential positive outcomes. 36 (8%) of the 
463 participants who endorsed the use of such directives 
mentioned conceptual benefits (subtheme) as a just-
ification, such as increased empowerment, autonomy, 
authenticity, and rights, and there was substantial overlap 
with the theme of distorted thinking when unwell. For 
example, one response from the endorsement group was 
“I use it myself. I give mental health staff permission to 
section me if needed. It gives back the power to me.”
58 (13%) of the 463 participants who endorsed the use of 
self-binding directives suggested that these directives 
might bring them potential practical benefits (subtheme of 
benefits), including ensuring treatment, minimising risk, 
and collaboration in, and continuity of, care. One example 
response from the endorsement group was: “When you 
are in either a manic or depressive episode you are more 
likely to stop people helping and just want to push away 
any help.” Some respondents described the cost–benefit 
analysis of weighing the consequences of not receiving 
treatment against the probable trauma of experiencing 
involuntary treatment (panel; appendix pp 8, 18). 
Eight participants explicitly pre sented self-binding direc-
tives as a way to reduce suicide risk. Some free-text answers 
were quite closely connected to the theme of distorted 
thinking when unwell.
A small group of participants rejected self-binding 
directives (65 [12%] of 565 participants) or were ambi-
valent about their use (37 [7%] of 565 participants), 
expressing doubts about the viability of such directives 
and the prospect of potential harms, which often directly 
conflicted with reasons given for endorsement.
The theme of logistical concerns about the drafting and 
implementation of self-binding directives was the most 
prevalent among participants who gave ambivalent 
(36 [97%] of 37 participants) and rejection responses 
(33 [51%] of 65 participants), and also appeared in 
res ponses of participants who endorsed the use of 
self-binding directives (63 [14%] of 463 participants). 
Many participants expressed concerns about the criteria 
for valid advance decision making, such as being properly 
informed. A common concern was that the self-binding 
directive would become out of date, as illustrated in a 
response in the rejection group: “A plan that is written 
when I am well is a good idea BUT I may have changed 
my mind about things and not updated the original plan.” 
Some respondents worried about the applicability of the 
self-binding directive to later circumstances, when they are 













411 (89%) 8 (22%) 8 (12%)
Valid thinking when 
unwell




58 (13%) 2 (5%) 1 (2%)
Subtheme: conceptual 
benefits




7 (2%) 8 (22%) 6 (9%)
Subtheme: conceptual 
harms
1 (<1%) 7 (19%) 26 (40%)
Logistical concerns 63 (14%) 36 (97%) 33 (51%)
Given that many individual responses contained multiple themes, the total 
percentages for distribution of themes within each group exceed 100%. 
Table 2: Distribution of themes and subthemes within response groups
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capacity at the time the directive was completed. 
Six participants from the ambivalence or rejection groups, 
along with six participants from the endorsement group, 
voiced concerns about ensuring that decision-making 
capacity for treatment was defi nitely impaired at the time 
of implementation. Four participants expressed concern 
about undue influence from family, clinicians, or others.
The theme of valid thinking when unwell was given as 
a reason for rejecting self-binding directives by 26 (40%) 
of the 65 participants who rejected the use of such 
directives; the term “valid” was used in several responses 
and thus was incorporated in the theme name. The idea 
of valid thinking when unwell seemed to directly 
challenge the theme of distortion of thinking when 
Panel: Quotations supporting themes and subthemes
Distorted thinking when unwell 
• “Being well and not being well are quite different states. 
Being not well puts one in a tricky place for making good 
decisions.” (endorsement group)
• “I feel an individual’s wishes should be respected although 
there is a point when an individual becomes too unwell and 
cannot make decisions for themselves.” (rejection group)
• “If it has been planned during well periods then that is a true 
representation of wishes.” (endorsement group)
• “You are unwell and lack capacity. I would agree with this 
statement looking back at when I was last sectioned but my 
views were very different at the time due to my illness. It is 
my well views and opinions that should be acted upon.” 
(endorsement group)
• “I wouldn’t have the capacity to make careful, reasoned 
judgements when unwell.” (endorsement group)
• “When I am ill, I am not of the right mind. So making a 
decision at this time would probably not have a good 
outcome.” (endorsement group) or “I think this because 
when I’m unwell I would not be making the right decisions 
for myself and my wellbeing.” (endorsement group)
• “I think that it should be respected as when I’m unwell I 
make unwise decisions.” (endorsement group)
• “Whilst unwell it is very common to have ideas that are not 
in one’s best interest.” (endorsement group)
• “Because when I’m in a depressive state I want to die, 
when I’m not I don’t. I’m a different person with different 
thoughts, feelings and reactions when I’m depressed or 
even manic, it wouldn’t be fair if I’d stated in my care plan to 
persist in treatment to get better but was refused because of 
my depressed or manic state.” (endorsement group)
• “Because psychosis intrinsically, temporarily, alters one’s 
judgement.” (endorsement group)
• “Because losing insight into one’s illness and experiencing 
resistance to treatment are such key features of bipolar 
episodes for so many people, and lack of treatment at these 
points can lead to harmful behaviours if treatment is not 
imposed.” (endorsement group)
• “Because when I am unwell I am irrational and unable to 
make healthy or safe decisions.” (endorsement group)
• “During episodes you lose the objectivity that is present 
when well. It helps if such objectivity is self-binding during 
periods of illness, provided the circumstances have been 
foreseen.” (endorsement group)
• “When psychotic or manic or depressed you can become 
another person and irrational. It is easy to make bad 
decisions when ill, that may not be in my best interest. 
You cannot have the lunatics running the asylum? Can we?” 
(endorsement group)
• “When we have an episode of high or low mood, we are not 
ourselves. We do not think straight.” (endorsement group)
• “When I am ill, all I see is the pain and torment of my 
existence, I want to die and any easy way would be seized 
upon and refusal of medication which I would do just 
cements these ideas. If I make a care plan whilst feeling 
normal I know I am far happier, contented and much more 
rational and l know that it would be bad for me and my 
family if I died. This is why I believe a care plan would work. 
At least then there is something in writing that I know is a 
true reflection of my life rather than the warped one my 
brain insists is true.” (endorsement group)
Conceptual benefits
• “Gives people voices before they are ill and unable to make 
them.” (endorsement group)
• “If it has been planned during well periods then that is a true 
representation of wishes.” (endorsement group)
Practical benefits
• “When feeling and thinking clearly, you can agree to sensible 
ideas of what type of care you may need. However, during 
an episode—manic or depressive—you don’t think the same 
and although you agreed certain things when well, it may be 
very difficult to deal with these decisions as they could be 
traumatic when unwell, even if they are there to help you 
get better.” (endorsement group)
• “Because when I am unwell, my thoughts, perceptions and 
desires drastically change. I can become suicidal and 
impulsive, making decisions or plans that I (would) later 
regret (if I had followed through with them). I often come 
out of an episode feeling extraordinarily grateful that I 
didn’t take my own life, but when I become ill the same 
thoughts and plans return to me regardless and I am 
convinced they are my true desires. I don’t want anyone to 
listen to me when I am unwell, I explicitly would want 
them to take my advance plans as my true wishes and 
would be mortified if they were overruled.” (endorsement 
group)
(Continues on next page)
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unwell. An example from the rejection group was: “I 
think how a person is feeling in a crisis is valid. As it’s 
valid at the time, the advanced statement might be 
temporarily invalid.” One powerful statement presented 
mania as a valid and positive dimension of the par-
ticipant’s life, contrary to the usual psychiatric evaluation. 
Another concern was that valid thinking might persist 
through some severe illness states, but not others, 
whereas the self-binding directive would apply during all. 
A small proportion (five [14%] of 37 participants) who 
gave ambivalent responses and even a few of those who 
endorsed the use of self-binding directives (seven [2%] of 
463 participants) shared these valid thinking reservations, 
without being convinced by them, illustrating the 
complexities of the cost–benefit analysis.
Some respondents presented the potential harms 
(theme) of self-binding directives as a reason for rejection 
or ambivalence regarding the use of self-binding 
directives, suggesting that the use of such directives could 
have damaging outcomes. 26 (40%) of the 65 participants 
who rejected the use and seven (19%) of the 37 participants 
who were ambivalent raised concerns about conceptual 
harms (subtheme), presenting a dis tinct idea: that, 
although thought processes might change when a person 
is unwell, this alteration does not necessarily render the 
thought processes invalid; therefore, to overrule decisions 
at this point risks contravening human rights. Many 
participants connected this idea with that of valid thinking, 
inverting the distorted thinking and conceptual benefits 
theme. Some participants used terms such as “mad” 
almost ironically, suggesting that decisions made when 
unwell might be contrary to an individual’s best interests, 
but still valid and worthy of respect. Others presented self-
binding directives as threatening auto nomy, self-respect, 
and civil liberties, in direct opposition to those who 
endorsed them as having the potential to enhance these 
very values. An example response from the rejection 
group was: “Being unwell does not necessarily mean that 
you are unable to make a decision that is not right for you. 
Considering what is best for someone is subjective and 
it would be against one’s human rights to not allow 
someone to change their mind about what is happening 
in a specific situation when a plan is made on what to do 
in a hypothetical one.”
The small number of participants who rejected the use 
of self-binding directives on the basis of concerns about 
potential practical harms (subtheme) provided a contrast 
to those who gave responses about the conceptual harm 
(subtheme), insofar as most supported clinical judgment 
taking precedence when a person was unwell. These 
participants worried that treatment instructions in self-
binding directives might be misguided, inappropriate for 
the circumstances, or even directly harmful, and might 
then hamper clinical decision making. Similar concerns 
were found within the responses of participants who 
were ambivalent about the use of self-binding directives; 
(Panel continued from previous page)
Logistical concerns
• “Could have changed between making and becoming so 
unwell, but not recorded...due to practicalities of life, 
and thus may not be true wishes.” (ambivalence group)
• “Things change and sometimes it’s difficult to guess what 
might happen in a hypothetical situation.” (ambivalence 
group)
• “How do you know they were of fit mind when they wrote 
it? How do you know someone else has not befriended that 
person for financial gain?” (ambivalence group)
• “It is hard to say. It depends how unwell you are in a 
particular circumstance. I have been unwell but still perfectly 
able to make my own decisions and on occasions I have 
been so unwell I’ve not been able to make my own 
decisions.” (ambivalence group)
• “It’s so hard with bipolar and my family are very controlling. 
I am afraid what could happen and knowing I were 
committed to it forever could be daunting.” (rejection 
group)
Valid thinking when unwell 
• “I am wary of being hospitalised when I am manic, because I 
do not feel that this is a destructive part of my illness: 
in fact, I enjoy it, am happy, productive, and move my life on 
in important ways, ways which I can’t do in hospital. 
However, I am well aware that psychiatric professionals all 
see mania as very destructive, even though my most 
destructive behaviour is by far when I am severely 
depressed. So, I assume that a psychiatrist would probably 
attempt to get me to agree to hospitalisation or treatment 
for manic episodes as well as depressive, which I do not 
want, but could not convince a psychiatrist of.” (rejection 
group)
• “Were I manic I might still have insight, were I psychotic 
probably not.” (ambivalence group)
Conceptual harms
• “Not empowering or respectful.” (rejection group)
• “Even when I’m mad, I’m still a human and have the right to 
make decisions even if they are bad ones.” (rejection group)
Practical harms
• “If a person says they wanted to stay home to be treated but 
are clearly a danger to themselves or others, hospital and 
care is the best place.” (rejection group)
• “It depends how ill you are. Docs sometimes have to make 
decisions in difficult circumstances in order to help you. 
A self-binding statement could get in the way. Then there is 
the question of legal responsibility and liability.” 
(ambivalence group)
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in their responses, concerns about practical harm 
marginally outweighed concerns about conceptual harm. 
Nevertheless, one response clearly questioned psychiatric 
viewpoints and rejected self-binding directives as 
potentially removing the benefits of mania. A typical 
example from the rejection group about the practical 
harms subtheme was: “I trust clinicians to be bound by 
their duty to treat me according to the immediate and 
presenting symptoms, not some guess made the 
previous year. They medicate, care, and where possible 
seek insight from friends and family. Sad fact, bipolar 
disorder can smash up the world and leave one picking 
up the pieces at a later time. So too can a broken back or 
shattered knees. Help me face the daunting haul back to 
autonomy following an episode, not shackle and fetter 
me with red tape.”
Discussion
People with bipolar disorder gave clear, rich, and varied 
responses describing their opinions regarding the use of 
self-binding directives. This empirical evidence supports 
the view that mental health law and practice should be 
adapted to accommodate a feasible self-binding directive 
model1–3 and, more generally, that we cannot define the 
successful outcomes of advance decision making in mental 
health purely in terms of avoidance of involuntary and 
inpatient treatment.12,16 Yet, despite overall pre dominance of 
endorsement of the use of self-binding directives, the 
presence of clear rejections and ambiva lence was based 
on varied concerns, such as logistics, or endangering 
autonomy, capacity, and clinical judgment, emphasising 
the need to take individual values and opinions into 
account. Such rejections and ambivalence certainly show 
that endorsement of the use of self-binding directives is not 
unanimous among people with bipolar disorder and that 
there are concerns that need to be addressed.
Self-binding directives are conventionally justified in 
terms of minimising risk by ensuring swifter access to 
treatment.1–3,5,17–19 However, the dominant justification 
given for the use of self-binding directives was the theme 
of distorted thinking when unwell and the resultant 
impairments of decision-making abilities, rather than 
risk avoidance. This dominance is all the more striking, 
given that all survey participants resided in countries 
where mental health laws are based on assessment of 
mental disorder and risk, rather than decision-making 
capacity. This finding might provide support for the 
enactment of so-called fusion proposals, in which mental 
health laws are based on impairments of decision-making 
capacity, rather than risk.20 Some statements supporting 
the use of self-binding directives did present mini-
misation of risk as a justification, particularly suicide 
risk. The possibility of such risk reduction might be a 
powerful argument for the use of self-binding directives, 
given that it is estimated that “about one-third to one-half 
of bipolar patients attempt suicide at least once in their 
lifetime and approximately 15–20% die due to suicide”.21
Participants presented distorted thinking when unwell 
as a determinate, unwelcome, and uncontrollable shift 
from healthy, authentic, and rational cognitive processes 
of decision making. This description contrasts with the 
commonly expressed fear that a self-binding directive 
might be implemented before the individual’s decision-
making capacity for treatment is sufficiently impaired. 
This fear has been a primary factor hindering clinical 
and legal introduction of self-binding directives, insofar 
as it has led to either rejection of self-binding directives 
or the imposition of impracticable legal safeguards.1–3 
Survey responses within the distorted thinking theme 
appeared to indicate widespread confidence that the 
transition to a severe state of illness would be 
accompanied by clear impairment of decision-making 
abilities concerning treatment. Concerns about early 
implementation of self-binding directives were presented 
as a reason for overall ambivalence or rejection of their 
use in only six responses.
The survey responses also challenge various alternative 
models of self-binding directives that have been proposed 
by researchers to address this early imple mentation 
problem and have been summarised by Gergel and 
Owen.1 Most controversial is a competence insensitivity 
model, that would allow implementation of a self-binding 
directive regardless of the individual’s decision-making 
capacity for treatment.1 Other models de-emphasise 
decision-making capacity in various ways. Some models 
view the self-binding directive as prioritising an indi-
vidual’s long-term values over those they hold when 
unwell;1 some propose risk, not decision-making capacity, 
as the criterion for implementation;22 and some adopt the 
idea that decision-making capacity varies by degrees, 
rather than there being a determinate threshold for 
implementation.19 By contrast, most responses in our 
survey from service users with bipolar disorder, whether 
they individually endorsed or rejected the use of self-
binding directives, appeared to assume that impaired 
decision-making capacity for treatment was a prerequisite 
and the reason for implementation of a self-binding 
directive. Moreover, most of these responses appeared 
to imply the acceptance of the medicolegal notion of 
decision-making capacity as a threshold concept, when 
they presented distorted thinking as a distinct, determinate 
shift from healthy and unimpaired decision making.
Concerns about vulnerability, often raised with respect 
to self-binding directives,1,2 do not feature in the survey 
responses. Such concerns might reflect status-based 
assumptions about the inherent psychological and 
epistemic vulnerabilities of people with mental illness 
and intellectual disabilities by those without lived 
experience of such conditions.23,24 For instance, res-
pondents did not express any concerns about potential 
emotional distress from discussing disturbing memories 
and topics while drafting a self-binding directive, and 
concerns about undue influence, or about self-binding 
directives hampering clinical judgment, were raised in 
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only 12 responses. Respondents appeared ready and able 
to articulate details about their illness and its effects on 
their thinking and decision making, and to understand 
these effects with great insight and clarity. Similar 
findings about the inapplicability of such concerns about 
vulnerability were reached in a more general study of 
advance decision making in mental health,8 and in 
studies suggesting that people with bipolar disorder tend 
to have good insight and understanding of illness when 
in remission.25,26 The degree of understanding shown in 
responses in our survey challenges the view that poor 
insight, or inability or refusal to acknowledge and 
understand one’s condition, and even lack of decision-
making capacity for treatment, persist during remission 
in bipolar disorder, and could impede shared decision 
making.27,28 Such a view is reflected, for example, in a 
Louisiana, USA, law requiring decision-making capacity 
to be formally certified by a clinician when a service user 
drafts an advance directive for treatment of mental, but 
not physical, health.2
Many survey respondents appeared to accept and 
articulate, either explicitly or implicitly, the experience of 
impaired decision-making capacity for treatment during 
severe episodes of bipolar disorder, with many including 
other psychiatric diagnostic categories and concepts 
sometimes considered controversial, including psy chosis, 
delusions, and loss of insight. These respon dents 
presented these experiences as constituting justifications 
for others to impose treatment decisions that can override 
their own treatment decisions while severely unwell. Such 
views could be seen to challenge human rights-based 
rejection of mental capacity assessment and involuntary 
treatment, and to help address some of the difficulties 
associated with the need to provide protection, while also 
respecting agency and autonomy. In particular, the UN 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has, 
in its General Comment No 1 (GC1), called for the 
abolition of both mental capacity assessment and 
involuntary treatment.10 However, the Committee also 
clearly supports advance decision making in its GC1, 
stating “all persons with disabilities have the right to 
engage in advance planning”,10 which has led countries 
such as India29 and Australia (in some states and territories 
including the Australian Capital Territory)30 to incorporate 
advance decision making into their mental health laws.3,31 
In its commitment to promoting “individual autonomy”, 
the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities presents mental capacity, defined as “the 
decision-making skills of a person”, as a flawed, “highly 
controversial” concept, which is “contingent on social and 
political contexts”.10 Furthermore, it argues that to deny 
any type of legal capacity, on the basis of impaired 
decision-making capacity, is inherently discriminatory 
and contravenes the individual’s core right to “equal 
recognition before the law”.10
The position of the UN Committee on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities would seem to remove the 
medicolegal foundations for both self-binding directives 
and advance decision making in general.32 More 
broadly, disagreements over whether coercive care can 
ever be justified have led to an impasse in the UN 
human rights system.33 The results from our survey 
might help to circumvent such difficulties, if we view 
self-binding directives as a means to support, rather 
than prohibit, the exercise of legal capacity. Clearly, 
many service users with bipolar disorder have found 
that severe illness distorts their thinking and thereby 
renders them temporarily unable to exercise legal 
agency and autonomy. They wish, therefore, to exercise 
their autonomy and manage their condition through 
advance treatment decisions that can be followed 
during future severe episodes.
A limitation of our study is generalisability, given that 
the survey was available only in English and the 
participants were predominantly white British, female, 
and well educated. The use of the UK mailing list as the 
sampling frame and a low response rate introduced 
further selection bias, as people with a previous aware-
ness of or interest in advance decision making are likely 
to be over-represented and the survey was only accessible 
to those with the necessary digital resources.11 Addi-
tionally, there was no means for checking the self-
reported professional diagnosis of bipolar disorder 
indicated by respondents.
The use of self-binding directives has also been 
discussed with regard to other types of episodic mental 
health condition. It would be useful to explore the idea 
with a broader range of participants, in a broader range 
of contexts and disorders. An implementation study 
(REC number 19/LO/1142) on self-binding directives for 
people with bipolar disorder, led by LS, and being 
implemented by LS, TG, GO, LR, and ARK, uses 
purposive sampling and actively attempts to engage 
those who have experience of compulsory treatment. 
Participants have been recruited to this study from a 
range of clinical services and might be less actively 
involved in third sector groups, such as Bipolar UK, and 
include a broader demographical range.
The most striking aspect of our results is the number 
and variety of endorsements by service users with bipolar 
disorder justifying the use of self-binding directives on 
the grounds of a major determinate shift and distortion 
of thinking and decision-making abilities occurring 
when unwell. The ethical, policy, and practical impli-
cations of these findings for advance decision making 
and decision-making capacity need further exploration. 
TG has been working on a more detailed analysis of 
answers from the distorted thinking theme, and further 
interviewing of service users with bipolar disorder or 
other mental health conditions could be valuable. The 
variety of responses suggests a need for a more 
personalised understanding of decision-making capa-
city,1,16 a particularly important point given the increasing 
significance of capacity assessment in mental health law 
Articles
www.thelancet.com/psychiatry   Published online May 20, 2021   https://doi.org/10.1016/S2215-0366(21)00115-2 11
and practice. Although the focus of the current study was 
on service user responses, TG and PD also analysed the 
dataset of 110 free-text carer responses, finding quite a 
strong association with the service user results. It would 
be valuable to consider these results in more detail, 
to obtain perspectives from another key group of 
stakeholders.
To conclude, these results highlight both a need to 
recognise the rights of people with bipolar disorder who 
want to use self-binding directives to manage their health 
and advance their autonomy, and the difficulties of trying 
to find a single approach to maximising autonomy within 
human rights in psychiatry.
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